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We assess the effect of fiscal rules on sovereign bond yields over the short and medium-term, for 
34 advanced countries and 21 emerging market economies, over the period 1980-2016. Our results, 
based on impulse response functions, show that the dynamic impact of fiscal rules on bond yields 
is negative and statistically significant, implying lower government’s borrowing costs. This is a 
result stemming essentially from the advanced economies subsample. Moreover, in times of 
recession, a fiscal rule leads financial markets to reduce the risk premia on government bonds. 
Finally, when it comes to design features of fiscal rules, independent monitoring of compliance to 
the rule also reduces sovereign yields.  
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Fiscal rules have been shown to be an effective instrument to prevent the build-up of public 
debt. The literature on fiscal rules' effectiveness has been motivated by the establishment of tax 
and expenditure limits in US federal states since the end of the 1970s and the Maastricht fiscal 
rules in Europe in the 1990s. The effectiveness of two different types of rules has been studied: 
rules for the budgetary processes (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999 and von Hagen and Harden, 
1995); and numerical fiscal rules.1 Overall, this literature is reasonably positive about the fact that 
rules are effective to enforce fiscal discipline. Therefore, they are likely to influence the 
expectations of investors and, consequently, the level of the risk premia.2 
Policy makers try to enhance their fiscal reputation through the establishment of national fiscal 
rules. The essential problem is that these rules may reflect stability-oriented preferences of a 
country's voters and politicians and, thus, the effect of fiscal rules on risk premia can be a result of 
a common-cause-interdependence: conservative fiscal preferences might have led both to the 
establishment of rules and to lower risk premia. This criticism is well known from the literature 
on the effectiveness of fiscal rules (Poterba, 1996): correlation of fiscal rules and low public 
deficits cannot necessarily be interpreted causally. Voters who dislike public debt will favor debt 
limits. If this is the case, the observed fiscal link between rules and fiscal policy outcomes could 
                                                 
1 The impact of numerical fiscal rules has been looked at in several regional contexts: for the US (e.g. Eichengreen 
and Bayoumi, 1994 and Poterba, 1996), for Europe (e.g. Debrun, 2000, Lagona and Padovano, 2007 and Debrun et al., 
2008), for OECD countries (e.g. Dahan and Strawczynski, 2010) and for Swiss cantons and municipalities (e.g. Feld 
and Kirchgässner, 2008). 
2 If such a link between rules and fiscal policy outcomes is anticipated by financial markets, the reaction of a rational 
investor is unambiguous: he should assess the sustainability of a country's fiscal stance more positively if it has a fiscal 
rule in place and demand a lower compensation for the default risk of the sovereign bond than for a comparable 





be spurious. In fact, there might be a reverse causality issue were budgetary outcomes themselves 
(high debt and high yields) may lead to the adoption of fiscal rules.3 
Hence, this methodological problem is of immediate policy relevance. The simple 
introduction of a new rule does not necessarily change preferences, in particular if it is established 
as a consequence of external pressure. If the markets rather pay attention to preferences than to 
written rules, they could remain skeptical regarding high debt countries and hence, do not lower 
risk premia.  
Therefore, we add to the literature by assessing the effect of fiscal rules on sovereign bond 
yields over the short and medium-term for a sample of 55 countries, 34 advanced and 21 emerging 
markets, in the period covering 1980-2016. In order to find an answer to the title question, we 
check if the introduction of fiscal rules is associated with lower government’s borrowing costs. 
Our results based on impulse response functions stemming from applying the local 
projection method, show that the dynamic impact of fiscal rules on bond yields is negative and 
statistically significant at usual levels. This is a result coming essentially from the advanced 
economies subset. Moreover, with extremely low growth, a fiscal rule leads financial markets to 
reduce the risk premia on government bonds. Independent monitoring of compliance to the fiscal 
rules also reduces sovereign yields, suggesting that design matters. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the most important 
related literature. Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses 
the main results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 For instance, Schaechter et al. (2012) report that several countries introduced fiscal rules after the 2008-2009 





2. Literature Review 
There are several studies addressing the relevance of fiscal rules for fiscal developments. 
For instance, Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2009) report that in the EU countries from 1990 to 2005, an 
increase in the share of government finances covered by numerical fiscal rules lead to lower 
deficits. Debrun et al. (2008) mention that stricter and broader fiscal rules are associated with 
higher cyclically adjusted primary balances. Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) find that fiscal rules 
and a lower degree of public spending decentralization in the EU contributes to a higher 
responsiveness of primary surpluses to government indebtedness (a Ricardian behaviour of the 
fiscal authorities). 
However, empirical studies dealing with the direct impact of fiscal rules on risk premia are 
not abundant. As already mentioned, it remains an open question whether these rules are genuinely 
effective or, instead, are effective just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and 
voters. For the US, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994) estimate the impact of several factors on the 
differential between the yields on the general obligation bonds of each US state relative to the 
lowest yielding general obligation bond. The estimated coefficient on the fiscal restraints suggests 
that, ceteris paribus, moving from no restraints to the most severe restraints reduces interest costs 
by nearly 50 basis points.4 In a subsequent related paper, Bayoumi et al. (1995) show that the 
impact of constitutional controls on US state borrowing depends on the level of public debt; at 
average debt levels, the presence of fiscal restraints is found to be associated with a reduction of 
the interest cost by 50 basis points. Poterba and Rueben (1999) find that US states’ fiscal rules 
play an important role in determining states’ borrowing costs. States with strict fiscal rules on 
government spending or deficits have faced lower borrowing costs during the last two decades 
                                                 
4 An interpretation of this result is that fiscal restraints lower the required return on general obligation bonds by 




than those with looser fiscal rules. Moreover, according to the authors, if fiscal rules are an 
important determinant of market interest rates, and if some rules are thought to reduce risk for 
bondholders, then such rules will have a larger effect on borrowing costs in some circumstances 
than in others. In particular, the economic effect of tight fiscal rules may be greatest when states 
are experiencing fiscal stress.  Poterba and Rueben (2001) focus on the interaction between deficits 
and rules. A sudden deficit increase lifts a state's financing costs, but the size of the rise is limited 
if the state has a strict rule. This result points to a credibility effect even in times of fiscal 
stress. Lowry and Alt (2001) show how laws that restrict state governments' ability to carry 
forward a deficit improve the ability of investors to extract information from noisy signals. This 
affects the response of bond markets to repeated deficits (by eroding credibility) in states that have 
these laws. Johnson and Kriz (2005) show that revenue limits have a direct impact on state 
government borrowing, while the effect of expenditure, budget balance, and debt rules is indirect 
via improved credit ratings. They only find a very modest effect of fiscal rules on bond spreads 
(between 2.4 and 3.3 basis points). 
In the Euro area context, Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) show that fiscal institutions play an 
important role for government bond yields. The quality of fiscal governance (particularly the 
budgeting process) is found to be a significant determinant of sovereign spreads.  Iara and Wolff 
(2011) do not find an overall significant effect of fiscal rules on risk spreads, but they do find a 
significant impact if they interact the fiscal rules indicator with the general risk aversion of the 
market. Thus, fiscal rules only have a negative effect on bond spreads in a market environment 
where risk sensitivity is high. They conclude that national fiscal rules are found to be beneficial 




Feld et al. (2012) find a robust negative effect of fiscal rules on bond spreads for Swiss 
cantons; this effect is quantitatively relatively strong (more than 10 basis points for strong rules). 
They are, for instance, often associated with strong enforcement mechanisms in the form of 
automatic tax adjustments after non-compliance with the numerical targets of the rules. 
In Heinemann et al.’s (2014) analysis of European bond spreads before the financial crisis, 
they shed light on this issue by employing several types of stability preference related proxies. 
These proxies refer to a country’s past stability performance, government characteristics and 
survey results related to general trust. The authors find evidence that these preference indicators 
affect sovereign bond spreads and dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules. Yet, the 
interaction of stability preferences and rules points to a particular potential of fiscal rules to restore 
market confidence in countries with a historical lack of stability culture. 
On the other hand, Afonso and Guimarães (2015) find that fiscal rules reduce budget 
deficits especially expenditure rules, while countries with better fiscal rules, notably the European 
Commission Fiscal Rule Index, experienced lower sovereign bond yields of around 25-35 basis 
points, in the period 1990–2011. Finally, Debrun and Kinda (2017) report that the existence of 
(better) fiscal councils also go hand in hand with stronger fiscal performance and fiscal forecasts, 
notably within a fiscal “reaction function” to explain primary balances’ developments in a sample 
of 28 mostly developed economies. 
 
3. Methodology and Data Issues 
Difficulties in identifying the effects of fiscal rules are well documented (see, for instance, 
Heinemann et al., 2014). With that in mind, we propose an alternative method to standard panel 




Our main testable hypothesis is that fiscal rules contribute to reduce government’s borrowing costs 
(proxied by sovereign bond yields) and, hence, by reducing the burden associated with the interest 
bill, they allow for the creation of fiscal space. 
Technically, to empirically estimate the dynamic impact on sovereign bond yields of fiscal 
rules over the short and medium-term, we follow the Jorda’s (2005) method. This method consists 
of estimating impulse response functions (IRFs) directly from local projections. For each period k 
we estimate the following regression: 
 
, − , = 	
 + ∑ 

 ∆, + , + ,
  + ,
  (1) 
 
with k=1,…,4 (in years) and where Y corresponds to the sovereign 10-year bond yield; , is 
a binary-type dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for the starting date of any fiscal rule 
(these can be of four types: expenditure, revenue, budget balance or debt) (in country i at time t) 
and is 0 otherwise. Using the starting year relates to an explicit intention to better identify our 
shocks and also minimize reverse causation issues; ,
  is a vector of control variables; 	
 are 
country fixed effects added to capture unobserved heterogeneity across countries and time-
unvarying factors; 
 and  are coefficients to be estimated for the lagged dependent variable and 
set of controls, respectively;  ,
  is a disturbance term satisfying usual assumptions; and   
measures the impact of fiscal rules for each future period k. The lag length (l) is set at 2 as selected 
by the Akaike-Information-Criteria, but our findings are strongly robust to different lag-structures.5  
                                                 




Equation (1) is estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator 
because the estimation includes lags of the dependent variable and also to partially correct for 
potential endogeneity issues (where the instruments used are lags of the included regressors). IRFs 
are obtained by collecting the estimated   with confidence intervals computed using  ’s 
standard errors.6  
Our sample consists of a total of 55 countries, 34 advanced and 21 emerging markets for which 
the International Monetary Fund’s fiscal rule dataset has information on (see IMF, 2009,7 and also 
there is sufficient data on sovereign bond yields (these come from the IMF’ International Financial 
Statistics and the OECD).8 The time span covers the 1980-2016 period. In line with the literature 
on the determinants of sovereign bond yields (or spreads) (see e.g. Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2007; 
Constantini et al, 2014; Afonso et al., 2014; and Poghosyan, 2014) the vector of controls includes 
real GDP growth, inflation rate (CPI-based) and the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio. These variables are 
retrieved from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Summary statistics of the main 
variables used in the empirical analysis are shown in Appendix’ Table A1. 
As far as fiscal rules are concerned we can plot the absolute number of new rules (of any type) 
over time by income group, and we get the pattern observed in Figure 1. Looking at advanced 
economies, while countries have implemented fiscal rules since the mid-1980s, most of them 
followed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (in adherence to the EU convergence criteria) as well as 
                                                 
6 The presence of a lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects could bias the estimation of 
 and in small 
samples (Nickell, 1981). However, in our case, this is not a problem since the finite sample bias is close to zero. 
7 The update is available here: http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/fiscalrules/map/map.htm). 
8 The list of countries is as follows. For advanced economies we have: US, UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, Cyprus, Israel, Hong Kong, Singapore, Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. For emerging markets we have: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Iran, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Hungary, 




after the Global Financial Crisis. In emerging market economies, the absolute number of fiscal 
rules is lower than the advanced economies sample, and most of them were implemented starting 
in the early 2000s. 
Figure 1. Distribution of New Fiscal Rules implemented over time by Income Group 
a) Advanced Economies b) Emerging Market Economies 
  
Source: International Monetary Fund’s fiscal rule dataset. 
 
.Looking at government’s borrowing costs (proxied by long-term (10-year) bond yields), 
Figure 2 shows that in both advanced and emerging market economies, there has been a 
convergence towards smaller and smaller yields. However, the downward speed in yields is faster 
for advanced than for emerging markets. During the global financial crisis period, the top quartile 
highlights the higher pricing of risk investors put on some stressed countries – a feature that has 
































Figure 2. Interquartile Range of 10-year Government Bond Yields over time by Income 
Group 
 
a) Advanced Economies b) Emerging Market Economies 
Source: the IMF’ International Financial Statistics and OECD. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Are Fiscal Rules Associated with Lower Borrowing Costs?  
Our main hypothesis is that the introduction of fiscal rules is associated with lower 
government’s borrowing costs and, hence, by reducing the burden associated with the interest bill, 
they would allow for the reinforcement of fiscal space. In Figure 3 Panel a), we observe that our 
main hypothesis can be considered as valid since the IRF – displaying the dynamic impact of fiscal 
rules on bond yields – is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 9 This result 
is mostly driven by the impact rules have in the advanced economies sample, since for emerging 
market economies such effect is not statistically different from zero (confidence bands above and 
below the horizontal axis).  
                                                 
9 Standard panel data regression analysis in the lines of Afonso and Guimaraes (2016) yield qualitatively similar robust 



































We also conducted sub-analysis by type of fiscal rule (not shown but available upon request) 
and found that, for the whole sample, the introduction of expenditure rules seems particularly 
relevant in lowering government’s borrowing costs (implementing either revenue-based, or debt-
based or budget balance-based rules, yielded insignificant or unclear results). As shown in 
Appendix Table’s A2, one year after the introduction of any type of fiscal rule, there is a decreas 
in sovereign yields of around 1.5 and 2 percentage points. This effect is mostly sustained until a 
time horizon of four years, but essentially stemming from the advanced economies sub-sample. 
Indeed, in the case of the emerging markets economies, the adoption a fiscal rule only decreases 
the yields one-year ahead, and even then not in a statistically significant way.10  
 
Figure 3. Dynamic impact on sovereign bond yields after the introduction of fiscal rules 
 
a) All countries b) Advanced 
Economies 
c) Emerging Markets 
Note: Dotted lines equal 90 percent confidence bands. The horizontal axis measures the number of years after the 
introduction of a given rule. 
 
4.2. Are Fiscal Rules Solely a Signaling Device?  
From the previous set of results one is left wondering if rules are indeed effective in 
reducing interest costs or whether there exists a hidden explanatory variable—which is the 
                                                 
10 For reasons of parsimony the detailed results underlying the remainder of IRFs presented in the paper are omitted 
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preference for fiscal discipline (or government “type”)—that can create an endogeneity bias. 
Indeed, it is not because fiscal rules are associated with lower borrowing costs that, on average, 
the introduction of fiscal rule can reduce borrowing costs (recall Poterba’s (1996) causal criticism). 
Perhaps fiscal rules are simply revealing/signaling the government’s (or voter’s) type instead of 
changing deep-rooted underlying fiscal behaviors (see Poterba and Rueben, 1999 for the US states) 
Our next exploratory step is to test the following (second) hypothesis: do rules have a 
stronger (negative) impact on borrowing costs in countries that are more fiscally responsible (or 
in a stronger fiscal position)?  
Here we measure fiscal responsibility in two alternative ways:  
- definition 1: with the level of debt-to-GDP ratio: countries with lower debt are associated 
with a sounder and healthier public finances; 
- definition 2: with the degree of fiscal policy counter-cyclicality. The latter – which we 
call FISCO – stems from the analysis presented in IMF’s (2015) April Fiscal Monitor Chapter 2 
and Furceri and Jalles (2016) and covers 69 countries between 1980 and 2016. 
To empirically test this second hypothesis, we run the following alternative regression: 
, − , = 	
 + ∑ 

 ∆, +  !" + 
#$%&'_))*$+ ∙  !" ∙ , +

#$%&'_)*$+ ∙ -1 −  !"/ ∙ , + ,
  + ,
  (2) 
 
with  !" =
012 3456"
012 3456"
,      = 1.5, where z is an indicator of the degree of fiscal responsibility 




variance.11 The remainder of the variables and coefficients are defined as in Equation (1). This 
method is equivalent to Granger and Teravistra’s (1993) smooth transition autoregressive model. 
The main advantage of this approach relative to estimating SVARs for each regime is that it uses 
a larger number of observations to compute the impulse response functions of only the dependent 
variables of interest, improving the stability and precision of the estimates. This estimation strategy 
can also more easily handle the potential correlation of the standard errors within countries, by 
clustering at the country level.12 
 In Figure 4, we plot the estimated coefficients coming from two separate regressions, one 
carried out for the debt-to-GDP ratio (definition 1) and another for the FISCO (definition 2). 
Countries that are fiscally more responsible (using either definition) are indeed those for which the 
introduction of a fiscal rule reduces government’s borrowing costs. The IRFs are negative and 
statistically significant throughout the 4-year horizon. Results for fiscally irresponsible countries 
yield IRFs that are statistically not different from zero (not shown). 
 
Figure 4. Dynamic impact on sovereign bond yields after the introduction of fiscal rules, 
fiscally responsible countries, all countries 
 
a. High fiscally responsible definition 1: measured by low 
public debt-to-GDP ratio 
b. High fiscally responsible definition 2: measured by high 
degree of fiscal counter-cyclicality (FISCO) 
  
Note: Dotted lines equal 90 percent confidence bands. The horizontal axis measures the number of years after the 
introduction of a given rule. 
                                                 
11 Changing the value for  does not qualitatively alter our main results. 
12 This approach has been applied to model non-linearities in number of different economic issues such as exchange 
rates dynamics (Sarrno and Taylor, 2002); sectoral performance during the business cycle (Fok et al. 2005); money 
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4.3. Does The Effect of Fiscal Rules Vary Over the Economic Cycle?  
The credibility impact on sovereign yields following the introduction of fiscal rules has 
particularly relevance depending on the phase of the business cycle. In order to explore whether 
changes in sovereign bond yields to fiscal rules shocks vary depending on the phase of the business 
cycle, the following alternative regression will be estimated: 
, − , = 	
 +  + ∑ 

 ∆, + 9 !" + 
:&; ∙ 9 !" ∙ , + 
<==; ∙
-1 − 9 !"/ ∙ , + ,
  + ,
  (3) 
with 9 !" =
012 3456"
012 3456"
,      = 1.5, where z is an indicator of the state of the economy (using 
the real GDP growth rate) normalized to have zero mean and unit variance.13 The remainder of the 
variables and coefficients are defined as in Equation (1). Figure 5 plots, for all countries, the results 
for both good and bad times and we can observe that in periods of extremely low growth, 
introducing a fiscal rule leads financial markets to reduce the risk premia on government bonds. 








                                                 
13 Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), δ = 1.5 is used for the analysis of recessions and expansions. 
Periods of very low (high) growth identified in this analysis also correspond to periods of large negative (positive) 




Figure 5. Dynamic impact on sovereign bond yields after the introduction of fiscal rules, 
good versus bad times, all countries 
 
a. Bad times b. Good times 
  
Note: Dotted lines equal 90 percent confidence bands. The horizontal axis measures the number of years after the 
introduction of a given rule. 
 
 
4.4. Does Design Matter?  
 Finally, our last testable hypothesis is whether fiscal rules help to reduce bond yields for 
those countries that are fiscally less responsible (the “poor” performers) but whose rules present 
some desired design features.  
, − , = 	
 +  + ∑ 

 ∆, + > !" +  ∙ ?@AB ∙ , + ,
  + ,

 (4) 
with ?@AB taking the value 1 when: i) the monitoring of compliance to the fiscal rule is done 
outside the government; ii) there exists a well specified escape clause in the rule; iii) there is an 
independent body that monitors the implementation of the rule; iv) there exists transparency and 
accountability in managing the rule; v) the rule includes a provision to adapt to business cycle 
conditions for stabilization purposes. These dummies characterizing a given fiscal rule take the 
value zero otherwise.  
Out of these 5 characteristics, the ones for which estimating equation (4) yields statistically 
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as having an average debt-to-GDP ratio over the 1980-2016 period above the respective country 
group’s (advanced economies or emerging markets) median for the same period) are displayed in 
Figure 6. We observe that, all countries considered, even for this group of ”poor” performers, the 
introduction of fiscal rules can indeed help to create fiscal space by lowering borrowing costs if 
the design of the rules includes sufficiently strong enforcement and the assistance of independent 
supporting institutions.  
 
Figure 6. Dynamic impact on sovereign bond yields after the introduction of fiscal rules, 
specific design characteristics, all countries, “poor” performers 
 
a. Monitoring of compliance outside government 
(enforcement) 
b. Independent body monitors implementation 
(supporting institutions) 
  
Note: Dotted lines equal 90 percent confidence bands. The horizontal axis measures the number of years after the 
introduction of a given rule. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
We have studied the effect of fiscal rules on sovereign bond yields over the short and medium-
term, for 34 advanced countries and 21 emerging markets, in the period 1980-2016. We have 
assessed how the existence of such spending, revenue or debt rules help reducing government’s 
borrowing costs. 
Based on our results, from estimated impulse response functions, we find that the dynamic 
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government’s borrowing costs. This is a result that rest mostly on the advanced economies country 
subset. Also, with extremely low growth, the existence of a fiscal rule leads financial markets to 
reduce the risk premia on government bonds. Moreover, if there is place an independent institution 
that monitors the compliance to the fiscal rules, this also contributes to reduce the government’s 
borrowing costs.  
From a policy perspective, we can then highlight that the existence of binding fiscal rules, 
clearly observable notably by capital markets, signal a lower sovereign default risk and 
institutional lenders can then demand a lower yield to the government. Therefore, it is worthwhile 
for the fiscal authorities to use such rules since there is a gain notably in terms of borrowing costs, 
and also in terms of signalling to the voters the government’s commitment to sounder and less 
costly fiscal policies. 
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Table A1. Summary Statistics of main variables 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Bond_10y 1403 7.38 6.42 -0.34 96.88 
Real GDP growth 2562 3.07 5.55 -96.95 71.53 
Inflation rate 2534 12.20 33.68 -10.38 432.83 
Debt-to-GDP ratio 1827 51.05 33.06 0.06 236.10 
Expenditure rule 1643 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Revenue rule 1643 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Budget balance rule 1643 0.52 0.49 0 1 
Debt rule 1643 0.39 0.48 0 1 
Any Fiscal rule 1643 0.57 0.49 0 1 
FISCO 1204 0.28 0.28 -0.61 2.17 
 
 
Table A2. Details of regressions underlying IRFs displayed in Figure 3 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Year after shock 
(t=0) 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Regressors/sample All countries Advanced economies Emerging market economies 
             
L.ltbondyield 0.619*** 0.585*** 0.528*** 0.413*** 0.645*** 0.599*** 0.501*** 0.431*** 0.516*** 0.451*** 0.356*** 0.195*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.040) (0.066) (0.073) (0.069) (0.070) 
L2.ltbondyield -0.234*** -0.282*** -0.265*** -0.248*** -0.463*** -0.614*** -0.576*** -0.597*** -0.089** -0.100** -0.097** -0.046 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) 
anyrule_start -2.109*** -1.572*** -1.839*** -2.187*** -1.565*** -1.655*** -2.175*** -1.990*** -0.872 0.716 0.418 1.133 
 (0.455) (0.454) (0.465) (0.444) (0.409) (0.403) (0.438) (0.392) (0.878) (0.978) (0.968) (0.999) 
Inflation_rate -0.045 -0.155*** -0.188*** -0.243*** 0.098** 0.007 -0.043 -0.091** -0.245** -0.220* -0.175 -0.203 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.038) (0.112) (0.133) (0.132) (0.135) 
Real GDP growth 0.221*** 0.219*** 0.149*** 0.146*** 0.071** 0.076** 0.039 0.040 0.293*** 0.260*** 0.250*** 0.265*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.076) (0.083) (0.079) (0.077) 
Debt-to-GDP -0.058 0.011 0.118*** 0.178*** -0.015 0.057 0.200*** 0.288*** 0.159 0.194 0.146 0.009 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.037) (0.114) (0.130) (0.124) (0.124) 
Observations 943 898 853 807 798 765 732 699 145 133 121 108 
Note: constant estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. Robust standard errors in parenthesis below each 
coefficient estimate. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
